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Abstract: Evolutionary game theory provides a fresh perspective on the prospects that agents
with heterogeneous expectations might eventually come to agree on a single expectation correspond-
ing to the e¢ cient markets hypothesis. We establish conditions where agreement on a unique fore-
cast is stable, but also show that persistent heterogeneous expectations can arise if those conditions
do not hold. The critical element is the degree of curvature in payo¤ weighting functions agents
use to value forecasting performance. We illustrate our results in the context of an asset pricing
model where a martingale solution competes with the fundamental solution for agentsattention.
Keywords: rational expectations, heterogeneous expectations, evolutionary game theory, asset
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1 Introduction
Models assuming a representative agent with rational expectations are ubiquitous in macroeco-
nomics, though they implicitly make strong assumptions about the availability and use of infor-
mation. Such approaches also stand in contrast to the variety of forecasting techniques (ARIMA,
VAR) in the econometric literature1. In an asset pricing environment, the assumption of a unique
rational forecast is embodied in the strong version of the e¢ cient markets hypothesis (EMH), where
asset prices depend solely on expected future dividends.
The EMH is the basis for much asset pricing theory (Cochrane 2001) and has empirical support
based on the unpredictability of returns (Fama 1991). However, some recent work suggests that
returns are predictable (Fama and French 1989), and that there are a number of other features of
the data, such as ARCH e¤ects (Engle 2001), excess kurtosis in returns and excess variance in asset
prices (Shiller (1981), LeRoy and Parke (1992)), that cannot be explained by models satisfying the
EMH.
There are many alternative forecasting strategies that do not satisfy the EMH, including "tech-
nical" trading and behavioral forecasting strategies.2 While these approaches can be criticized
for violating rational expectations, there does exist a continuum of martingale or rational bubble
solutions that do satisfy rationality.3 How agents are able to coordinate on the EMH equilibrium
in the presence of such a multiplicity of forecasts is an open question.
The present work proposes to allow agents a choice. The model presented here is a variant
of Parke and Waters (2007) where agents could switch between forecasting strategies based on the
EMH and martingale solutions. Simulation results in that work show that the model explains
1The econometrics literature in the tradition of Box and Jenkins (1970) specically focuses on the advantages of
empirical models over theory-based models.
2Covel (2004) describes the benets of trend following. Hommes (2006) surveys models with heterogeneous,
boundedly rational forecasts.
3Blanchard (1979), Evans (1991) and Charemza and Deadman (1995) are examples of rational bubble models.
Pesaran (1987) discusses the implications of the multiplicity of solutions.
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empirical features of asset pricing data such as ARCH e¤ects in returns that models based on the
EMH or representative agent rational bubbles cannot. The focus here is to examine the underlying
conditions necessary for agents to adopt forecasts based on martingale solutions.
Evolutionary game theory provides a mechanism describing how agents might switch forecast-
ing strategies based on performance, so their ability to coordinate becomes an outcome, not an
assumption, of the model. The primary result is that coordination on a unique forecast based on
the EMH is possible but requires very strong assumptions. The stochastic innovations in the mod-
els must be su¢ ciently bounded and agents must not be overly aggressive in switching strategies.
Hence, the assumption of a representative forecast based on the EMH is potentially misleading.
All agents have the same information about the underlying model and the available forecasts
satisfy rational expectations.4 Di¤erences in agentschoices of forecasting strategies arise due to
di¤erences of opinion about the information that should be used. We focus on three forecasting
strategies: the fundamental forecast based solely on expected future dividends according to the
EMH, the mystic forecast that uses an extraneous martingale, and the reective forecast, which
is a weighted average of the other two. The reective forecast provides an unbiased forecast,
satisfying rational expectations even in the presence of heterogeneity of forecasting strategies in
the population. The reective forecast follows the literature that sets out an econometric view of
the merits of combining forecasts.5
The evolution of the fractions of agents using the three strategies is determined by a weighted
replicator similar to that in Hofbauer and Weibull (1996), which is an example of an imitative
dynamic from the evolutionary game theory literature, see Sandholm (2011). The payo¤s are
based on forecast errors, following common methods for evaluating forecasts in the time series
literature, see Elliot and Timmerman (2008). Imitative dynamics allow for the analysis of a
4There are a number of boundedly rational or behavioral alternative forecasting strategies. While some of these
are appealing, we focus on rational bubble forecasts to introduce heterogeneity in a disciplined way.
5Bates and Granger (1969) and Granger and Raanthan (1984) discuss the potential benets. Elliot and Tim-
merman (2008) has references such as Stock and Watson (1999) that empirically verify that combining forecasts can
improve performance.
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situation where one strategy is eliminated, in contrast to multinomial logit dynamics. A weighting
function transforms the payo¤s and allows for the modeling of varying degrees of aggressiveness
in switching between strategies over time. Under a linear weighting function, the dynamic is
equivalent to the replicator, but, for a convex weighting function, agents switch to better performing
strategies faster.
The primary goal of the analysis is to determine conditions under which a small fraction of
agents experimenting with mysticism can gain a signicant following. When no agents use the
mystic forecast, the fundamental and reective forecasts coincide and the model satises the EMH.
However, if a signicant fraction of the population adopts the mystic forecasting strategy, the
extraneous martingale has an impact on the asset price. Now, we can state the results more
precisely. If the shocks to the dividends and the martingale innovations are su¢ ciently large
and the weighting function is su¢ ciently convex, implying aggressive switching, then persistent
heterogeneity in the forecasting strategies is likely, which would violate the EMH. The results are
determined through both formal stability analysis and simulations of the model.
The present approach has overlaps with the literatures on learning, nance and the evolution
of forecasting strategies. Within the learning literature, expectations are often homogeneous as
well, as with the analysis of least squares learning in Marcet and Sargent (1989a) or studies on
gradient learning (Evans, Honkapohja and Williams 2005). There are examples of heterogeneous
expectations with xed fractions of agents having idiosyncratic information in both the nance
literature, Constanides and Du¢ e (1996) for example, and in the learning literature (Marcet and
Sargent (1989b) and Evans and Guesnerie (2005)) including studies of agents learning sunspot
solutions (Branch and McGough (2004)).
There is a substantial literature with dynamic switching of forecasting strategies using the
multinomial logit model, particularly with the cobweb model (Brock and Hommes (1997), Hommes
(2006)) and with asset pricing6 (Brock and Hommes (1998) and Föllmer, Horst, and Kirman (2005)).
Anufriev and Hommes (2012a) estimate a multinomial logit model with multiple forecasting strate-
gies using experimental asset market data, arguing that the data can only be explained through
6Branch and Evans (2007) study dynamic switching with multinomial logit in a Lucas-style macro model. Horst
and Wenzelburger (2008) examine the long-run behavior of a related asset pricing model.
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the consideration of heterogeneous forecasts.
There are applications of imitative dynamics. In a cobweb model, Sethi and Franke (1995) and
Branch and McGough (2008) use alternative versions of the replicator to describe the evolution of
agentschoices between adaptive and perfect foresight forecasts and show conditions where chaos
arises. As with the multinomial logit approach in Brock and Hommes (1997), agents using the
perfect foresight forecast must pay a xed cost. In the present approach, all agents have the same
choice of forecasting strategies available to them, and we do not impose a cost. Fundamentalists
ignore the martingale because they believe it is extraneous, not due to the cost of information.7
Branch and Evans (2006) and Guse (2010) describe the evolution of models with two costless
forecasts in a small macro model and an asset pricing environment, respectively. The paper by
Guse (2010) uses an imitative dynamic but varies from the present approach in a number of ways.
Agents update parameter estimates and their choice of forecasting model each period, there are
only two available forecasting strategies, based on fundamentals or a sunspot, and agents pay a cost
for using a forecasting model that admits extraneous information. In this environment, results
from simulations show that persistent heterogeneity cannot arise if the cost is su¢ ciently large.
Blume and Easley (1992) is a prominent example from a related literature that studies the long
run survival of investment strategies. These models do not specify the fractions of followers of
di¤erent strategies each period but focus on the limiting ratios of payo¤s between strategies. Hens
and Schenk-Hoppé (2009) review recent developments.
The experimental literature conrms that asset pricing with heterogeneous agents can produce
a wide range of behaviors. Anufriev and Hommes (2012b) provide results from recent studies.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the asset pricing model, the three
forecasts and their payo¤s, and section 3 discusses the evolutionary dynamics. Section 4 contains
the formal stability results, and section 5 describes the simulation results. Section 6 concludes.




A simple asset pricing model motivates a number of the important concepts. For an asset price
yt, the notional model is a basic recursion
yt = y
e
t+1 + ut; (1)
where  < 1 is a discount factor, yet+1 is the expected price next period and the dividends term
ut is a stochastic income ow.8 This model has a solution under rational expectations based only
on fundamentals (current and expected future dividends here), but (1) also admits rational bubble
solutions that depend on extraneous variables. Convergence to agreement on a single expectation
yet+1 is viewed here as a possible conclusion rather than as an assumption. Given heterogeneous
expectations and mean-variance optimizing agents, Brock and Hommes (1998) discuss conditions9
under which the realized security price depends on the weighted average of agentsexpectations.10
They show that
yt =  xt  et + ut; (2)
where et is a vector of the forecasts of yt+1 and xt is a vector of the fractions of the population
using each forecast. Here, the vector et = (e1;t; e2;t; e3;t) represents the three forecasts reectivism
e1;t, fundamentalism e2;t and mysticism e3;t, and the fractions of followers are given by the vector
xt = (x1;t; x2;t; x3;t).
The discounted present value of the expected income stream
8This equation could equally apply to aggregate prices, exchange rates, etc..
9 In particular, there is a constant supply of a risky asset, and agents have a common belief about the variance of
the returns.
10There are several important di¤erences between our analysis and Brock and Hommes (1998). Our choice of
strategies di¤ers from theirs. Brock and Hommes take payo¤s to equal trading prots, which are a linear rather than
concave function of forecast errors. Their discrete choice updating mechanism, as we note in the next section, does
not allow for convergence to a single expectation.
8






t is an information set available to the agents, will serve as a point of reference as it satises
the strong version of the EMH, though it is not the unique solution to (1). The natural candidate









While it is common to assume that all agents somehow recognize e2;t as the appropriate forecast,
we make the following less restrictive assumption.
Assumption 1: The fraction x2;t of the agents using the fundamental forecast e2;t is bounded
from below by 2 > 0 for every t.
These unyielding fundamentalists might well be impressed by the fact that (4) is touted by a
large fraction of the academic literature in economics and nance. They do not need to take a
position on, for example, the merits of transversality conditions vs. minimum state variables as a
basis for (4) to recognize that (4) is prominently featured in Cochrane (2001) and McCallum (1983,
1997).
We select a challenger to the fundamentalist forecast from among the martingale or rational
bubble solutions to the model (1). This alternative forecast will be




t) +  t 1mt: (5)
where mt = mt 1 + t is a martingale. We label this forecast mysticism because, while 
 tmt is
thought by economic theorists to be extraneous, agents believing in (1) cannot rule out a martingale
solution on the basis of that mathematical model.11 Followers of the mystical forecast might, for
11Even an auxiliary belief in a stationary solution does not rule out a martingale in a nite number of periods. It
is not possible to know with certainty that mt is nonstationary from a nite data sample. In fact, when mysticism
grows in popularity, that growth will often occur in the rst few periods, well before tests for nonstationarity have
useful power.
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example, sincerely believe that  t 1mt is a valid addition to the fundamentals for yt. In fact, the
martingale does inuence yt if the mystical forecast attracts followers.
Both the fundamental forecast (4) and mysticism (5) satisfy rational expectations in the homo-
geneous case, but this observation may not hold if there is heterogeneity in the choice of forecasting
strategies in the population. Hence, the reective forecast is postulated to be an average of the
fundamental and mystic forecasts weighted according to their relative popularity.






is the proportion of followers of the mystical forecast x3;t among those not following the reective
forecast 1   x1;t = x2;t + x3;t. Such a forecast follows the literature on the benets of combining
forecasts. See Elliot and Timmerman (2008) for multiple references. The above ratio shows one
reason for the imposition of a minimum fraction 2 using fundamentalism is to avoid dividing by
zero. Since reectivism is based on other forecasts, there must be at least one other forecast in
the population for reectivism to be well specied.




t) +  t 1ntmt; (8)
which can be veried with the four previous equations. The martingale a¤ects the reective forecast
according to the relative popularity of mysticism and fundamentalism. The realization for yt can





The realization is thus the fundamentalist forecast plus, to the extent that some of the agents
are following mysticism, a martingale term. Unlike the fundamental and mystic forecasts, both
the realization (9) and the reective forecast embody available information about the fractions of
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the population using the di¤erent strategies. By construction the aggregate expectation xt  et in
(2) coincides with the reective forecast. For the three given forecasting strategies the aggregate
expectation is x1;te1;t+x2;te2;t+x3;te3;t. Substituting for e1;t and nt using (6) and (7) demonstrates
that the aggregate expectation and the reective forecast are equivalent.
Payo¤s are given by the negative of the squared forecast error
i;t =  (yt   ei;t 1)2: (10)
Evaluating forecasts using squared errors has a long tradition in econometrics.12 In an asset
pricing context, there are a number of choices for payo¤s such as realized prots, excess returns or
Sharpe ratios. For the present asset pricing model, Hommes (2001) shows that (10) is the natural
objective function for mean-variance maximizing agents. If agents adjust for risk based on the
variance of the prots, then forecast errors are a more appropriate payo¤ than realized prots.
The reective forecast error




t   E(yt j
t 1)) +  t(ntmt   nt 1mt 1): (11)
The rst term on the right is the innovation in fundamentals, and the second term on the right is
the weighted martingale innovation.
The reective forecast is unbiased given the information assumed to be available to the agents.
The innovation to the dividends has mathematical expectation zero. The expression in parentheses
in the second term can be written ntmt 1+ ntmt where nt is the change in nt and mt = t
is the martingale innovation. If the expectation E(ntj
t 1) is zero, then the expected reective
forecast error E(Utj
t 1) is zero, since the innovations to the dividend and martingale are also
unforecastable. Agents are assumed to be unable to forecast changes in the choices of forecasting
12Elliott and Timmerman (2008) discuss the role of mean squared prediction error and forecast combination in the
literature on forecasting.
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strategies across the population. While they can observe fractions of followers of the forecasting
strategies, they do not understand the dynamics describing the evolution of these fractions. (See
footnote 13 in the next section.)
The payo¤ (10) to reectivism is
1;t =  U2t : (12)
The payo¤s to mysticism and fundamentalism also depend on At 1 =  tmt 1. Intuitively, Ut
depends primarily on innovations and At 1 depends on the level of the martingale and consequently
is non-stationary. The fundamentalist forecast error
yt   e2;t 1 = Ut + nt 1At 1
from (9) and (4) includes a fraction of the martingale term because, to the extent that some of the
agents are following the mystical forecast, the realization (9) is a¤ected by the martingale term.
Note that if mysticism is driven out of the population so that nt 1 = 0, then the fundamental
forecast coincides with the reective forecast. The fundamentalist payo¤ is
2;t =  U2t   2nt 1UtAt 1   n2t 1At 12: (13)
The mystic forecast error is
yt   e3;t 1 = Ut   (1  nt 1)At 1
from (9) and (5), and the resulting payo¤ is
3;t =  U2t + 2(1  nt 1)UtAt 1   (1  nt 1)2At 12: (14)
Any of the three forecasting strategies could have the best payo¤ depending on the realizations
of Ut and At 1, as detailed in Table 1. If At 1 is large relative to Ut, then the third terms,
referred to as martingale terms, in the payo¤s to fundamentalism (13) and mysticism (14) are the
dominating feature causing both payo¤s to under-perform reectivism. The reective forecast is
constructed such that the martingale does not a¤ect its payo¤, so, when the martingale term is
large, reectivism is best. However, if At 1 is not large and the covarianceUtAt 1 is large and
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positive, then mysticism could have the best payo¤. Such an outcome corresponds to a fortunate
(for the mystic) correlation between the martingale and the innovations in the model. Similarly, a
large and negative covariance favors fundamentalism.
<Table 1 here>
Despite these observations, reectivism does have an inherent advantage over the other strate-
gies, as one might expect given that the reective forecast embodies extra information about the
other forecasts and their fractions of supporters. Many evolutionary game theory dynamics depend
on the tness of the strategies, the di¤erence between payo¤s and the population average payo¤
t given by t = x1;t 11;t + x2;t 12;t + x3;t 13;t. In particular, the replicator dynamic with a
linear weighting function w () in (16) has the property that the fraction of agents using a strategy
adjusts proportionally with the tness of that strategy. Here, the population average is




While At 1 does not enter the payo¤ 1;t =  U2t to reectivism, if there is any heterogeneity in
the population, it does a¤ect the population average. Under the linear weighting according to
population shares for t, the covariance terms in the mystic and fundamental payo¤s cancel, so the
population average payo¤ cannot be superior to the reective payo¤. Hence, the following holds.
Remark 1 The tness of reectivism 1;t   t is always non-negative.
Under the standard replicator dynamic, the evolution of the vector xt describing the strategy
choices in a population is driven by the tness of the strategies. The above Remark suggests the
reectivism has an ever increasing following under the replicator, and the point where the maximum
fraction of the population is using reectivism is stable, though much work remains to be done to
formalize this idea. First of all, the standard replicator may be problematic in an environment
with payo¤s that are negative and stochastic. Furthermore, the analysis should allow for a greater
range of behavior than specied by the replicator.
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3 Curvature and Selection Dynamics
The evolutionary dynamic studied here, called the weighted replicator, allows the study of stability
of points where one strategy is eliminated. Further, the speed that agents switch to better perform-
ing strategies is naturally parameterized within the weighted replicator. The goal is to examine
the relationship between agent aggressiveness and the stability of a point where mysticism is not
adopted by any agents. Given the notation for payo¤s and strategy choices above, the general form
of the dynamic is as follows.




where the weighting function w () is increasing in the payo¤s, and the expression wt is the popu-
lation average weighted according to the popularity of the strategies so that
wt = x1;t 1w (1;t) + x2;t 1w (2;t) + x3;t 1w (3;t). Strategies with above average payo¤s gain
adherents. Dynamics such as (16) with xi;t 1 on the right-hand side are also imitative in that the
popularity of a strategy a¤ects its popularity in the following periods13. The timing in (16) di¤ers
from the customary replicator dynamic. We make this choice since the time t payo¤s depend on
a forecast made in time t  1; which in turn depend on the time t  1 fractions of followers of the
strategies xi;t 1. Simulations with an alternative timing are conducted as a robustness check14.
For a linear weighting function, the dynamic (16) corresponds to the replicator, see Weibull
(1998), but this is not the only possibility. Hofbauer and Weibull (1996, p. 563) note that
curvature in w() can change agent behavior in an evolutionary game somewhat analogously to
13Such dynamics emerge from learning models where myopic agents repeated play a game and update their strategy
choices over time. Hence they are not aware of the equation describing the evolution of xt like the one above, as
noted in the discussion of the reective forecast error following eq. (11).
14Parke and Waters (2007) use an alternative timing in a related model. As occurs for some discrete time dynamcis,
see Weibull (1998, section 4.1), the present approach can produce overshooting, where xi;t could fall below zero or
the fraction of fundamentalists falls below 2. For the simulations, we specify that if xi;t falls below its minimum,
it is reset to that value for the next period and the other fractions are set proportional to the fractions given (16).
More details are given in section 5..
14
how curvature in utility functions can a¤ect behavior toward risk in other settings. The degree of
nonlinearity parameterizes a property that we interpret as agent aggressiveness. We interpret a
weighting function that places a relatively large weight on only small squared errors as symptomatic
of agent aggressiveness in pursuing accurate forecasting strategies. A weighting function that makes
a more moderate distinction between large and small squared errors characterizes less aggressive
agents.
A second consideration, enforcing the non-negativity condition w (i;t)  0, also motivates
using nonlinear weighting functions. Non-negativity, which is common in static games, is desirable
because wt appears in the denominator of (16) and wt  0 would be a problem. Weighting
functions that achieve non-negativity are inherently nonlinear because no linear transformation of
the squared error payo¤s will be unambiguously nonnegative.
We consider two particular nonlinear payo¤ weighting functions that enforce w (i;t)  0 and
parameterize agent aggressiveness for the general dynamic (16).
Truncation Weighting. A simple way to achieve non-negativity is to work with the weighting
w (i;t) = C+i;t, where C is a constant chosen so that C+i;t > 0 for all strategies and all periods.
The revised replicator dynamic then becomes




In static game theory, the form of the replicator (17) is quite su¢ cient as it is easy to choose C to
be larger than the biggest payo¤.15 Here, there is no lower bound for  U2t in the payo¤s, but the
truncation function
w() =
8><>: C +  if C +   00 if C +  < 0
9>=>; (18)
guarantees non-negativity without requiring C + i;t  0 for all strategies and all periods.
The parameter C can be viewed as parameterizing agent aggressiveness. If C is small, then
w() = 0 for all but the smallest forecast errors because agents regard strategies with larger forecast
15Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988, p. 133), Hofbauer and Sigmund (1998, pp. 76-7), Samuelson (1997, p. 66), and
Weibull (1998, pp. 122-3) discuss this version of the replicator dynamic.
15
errors as worthless. Smaller values for C increase the ratio (i;t   t) =(C + t), causing a bigger
change xi;t+1   xi;t for a given i;t   t and t.
Exponential Weighting. The exponential transformation
w() = e=(2
2) (19)
achieves non-negativity without sacricing smoothness. The resulting dynamic is an example of a
convex monotonic dynamic as discussed in Hofbauer and Weibull (1996).
Applying the exponential transformation to the squared forecast error i;t =  (yt   ei;t 1)2
produces a familiar functional form
w(i;t) = e
 (yt ei;t 1)2=(22): (20)
This is a normal probability density. The meanof the forecast error yt   ei;t 1 is zero and the
variance is 2. The parameter 2 has no necessary relation to the statistical properties of the
forecast errors. It instead determines how agents react to large and small squared forecast errors.
In the present context, 2 parameterizes agent aggressiveness. If 2 is large, w(i;t) is not very
sensitive to the magnitudes of the forecast errors. Equivalently, agents are not very aggressive
about pursuing the best forecasting strategy. If 2 is small, agents assign appreciable value to only
the smallest forecast errors. Hofbauer and Weibull (1996, p. 563) describe the e¤ect of convexity
as individuals react over-proportionally to higher payo¤s,as opposed to the replicator where the
population shares adjust proportionally to tness.








The search intensity parameter  is assumed to be positive. The primary reason we opt for an
imitative dynamic is that under the MNL dynamic all strategies maintain a fraction of followers
even if their performance is consistently poor. See Waters (2009) for a detailed discussion.
The parameterization of agent aggressiveness in the present context with imitative dynamics is
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related to the search intensity parameter. Compare the weighted replicator (16) with exponential
weighting (19) and the multinomial logit dynamic (21) where there are two strategies to choose from.
A lower  and  indicate higher aggressiveness and search intensity in the respective dynamic leading
to more followers for the better performing strategy under both. However, since the multinomial
logit dynamic determines the level, as opposed to the change, in xi;t, the search intensity parameter
should not be interpreted as a speed of adjustment parameter as with the aggressiveness parameter
in the present approach. To parameterize the speed of adjustment with a multinomial logit
approach, one can use the weighting on an average of past payo¤s, as in equation 4.5 of Brock and
Hommes (1998).
4 Stability Analysis
We are interested in the stability properties of a system that we can summarize as follows. In period
t, the population fractions xi;t; i = 1; :::; k; determine the choices among forecasts ei;t; i = 1; ::::; k;
and the realization of the asset price
yt =  xt  et + ut:
This is (9) above. Agents choose among the reective forecast (8), the fundamentalist forecast (4),
and the mystical forecast (5). The payo¤s are determined by squared errors of the forecasts
i;t =  (yt   ei;t 1)2:
This is (10) above. It takes the specic forms (12), (13) and (14) for reectivism, mysticism, and
fundamentalism, respectively. The selection dynamic
xi;t+1   xi;t = xi;t 1
w (i;t)  wt
wt
produces the population fractions for period t + 1. This is (16) above. We consider two choices
for w (i;t), truncation weighting (18) and exponential weighting (19).
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4.1 Truncation weighting
The stability of the system depends on the parameter C that characterizes agent aggressiveness
compared to the magnitude of the shocks. In Section 5 we explore some unstable regions using
simulations. In this section, we establish a rigorous extension of Remark 1 for truncation weighting
(18). The proof of stability shows that, given a bound on Ut2 and a minimum fraction of agents
following fundamentalism, for every t either the fraction following reectivism increases or mysticism
is eliminated from the population. In either case, all agents end up following either the fundamental
forecast or the reective forecast, which are then identical. Intuitively, under such a bound, the
covariance terms in the payo¤s to mysticism and fundamentalism cannot have su¢ cient inuence
on the dynamics for mysticism to attract a following.
The proof can be described informally. If the payo¤s to all three strategies are greater than  C,
then there is no truncation and the logic of Remark 1 is straightforward. The covariance terms do
not appear in the population average payo¤ so reectivisms tness is always non-negative, and its
share cannot fall. For mysticism to attract followers, the payo¤ to fundamentalism must be below
 C and the payo¤ to mysticism must be best. However, for fundamentalism to perform so badly,
A2t 1 must be large, but if it is too large, the reective payo¤ is greater than the mystic payo¤.
Therefore, for Ut su¢ ciently bounded, the e¤ect of the covariance term on the mystic payo¤ is
limited, and there is no A2t 1 that is simultaneously large enough to force the fundamentalist payo¤
below  C and small enough so that mysticism outperforms reectivism.
Denition 2 Let  = fxjx1 + x2 + x3 = 1; x2  2g be the set of admissible points in the simplex,
and let B(y; ")=fz 2 j ky   zk < "g be the open ball around a point y within .
Note that if xt is in the set of admissible points , then nt < 1  2, which is necessary for the
proof of the following.
Proposition 3 There exists a constant ' 2 (0; 1) such that for the dynamics given by (16) and
(18) and for the payo¤s (12), (13) and (14), if Ut satises the condition for any xt 2 
Ut
2 < 'C;
then x1;t+1  x1;t or x3;t+1 = 0.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Given the bound above, either the fraction of followers of reectivism increases or mysticism is
eliminated from the population. This proposition implies stability of the point where the maximum
number of agents are using reectivism. To be more precise, consider the following denition.
The following denition is adapted from Lakshmikantham and Trigiante (2002, section 4.1).
Denition 4 A point ex is uniformly stable if for any " > 0 there exists a  > 0 such that xt 2
B(ex; ) implies that xt+k 2 B(ex; ") for any positive integer k.
While this version of stability does not apply directly to the present model, a slightly modied
version captures the implications of Proposition 3 in the following Corollary.
Corollary 5 For the model in Proposition 3 given that the condition on Ut holds for all t, the point
where the maximum fraction of agents is using reectivism ex = (1  2; 2; 0) has the following
property. For any " > 0, there exists a  > 0 such that if xt 2 B(ex; ) then for every k > 0,
xt+k 2 B(ex; ") or x3;t+k = 0 meaning mysticism is eliminated.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 implies that the point with the maximum fraction of agents using reectivism
satises a weak version of stability in the sense that if xt is in a neighborhood of ex; then, for an
appropriate bound on Ut from (11), it will remain there for future periods or mysticism will be
eliminated. The logic of the proof of Proposition 3 is relevant for any point in the interior of
the simplex for an appropriately chosen bound. The bound on Ut implies bounds on both the
innovations in the dividends and the martingale that are necessary conditions16 for Proposition 3
to hold.
Proposition 3 shows that mysticism, which does not conform to the EMH, cannot achieve a
signicant following if a su¢ ciently tight bound on the reective forecast error can be established,
relative to the aggressiveness of the agents represented by C. However, persistent heterogeneity
16 It is not possible to show that bounds on the innovations imply a bound on the reective forecast, but, for
practical purposes, this is the case. Investigation of alternative versions of the model where this point may be made
explicitly are left for future work.
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of forecasts is also a viable possibility. It is notable that a result such as Proposition 3 can
be established in an environment allowing for heterogeneous expectations, but it is questionable
that bounding stochastic elements such as dividend innovations is realistic. Black swans in
asset markets would violate such bounds, for example, as would some realizations under normally
distributed dividends though such events could be rare. Simulation results in the next section help
to clarify the quantitative importance of the formal analysis.
The stability concept arising from Proposition 3 is adapted from the theory of deterministic
di¤erence equations to an environment with stochastic payo¤s. Stability theory for deterministic
di¤erence equations is well developed, see Lakshmikantham and Trigiante (2002) for example. Even
so, they identify eleven di¤erent versions of stability (Denition 4.1.2) depending on whether the
variable in question remains within a neighborhood of a point or converges to a point in the limit
and depending on the speed of convergence. The stability theory for stochastic games has few
general results, since there are a number of ways to introduce randomness. For example, Hofbauer
and Sandholm (2007) study the evolutionary dynamics of simple games with random payo¤s and
examine the limiting behavior as the randomness is eliminated. In Kandori, Mailath and Rob
(1993), agents make occasional mistakes in their strategy choice, and the authors show there are
absorbing sets for the populations strategy choices..
The stability concept in Proposition 3 is "weak" in the sense that it does not guarantee conver-
gence to ex either locally or globally. However, although the present model is stochastic, the stability
concept is deterministic. With more restrictive model assumptions, it is possible to demonstrate
a stronger version of stability, but the primary goal of the paper is to demonstrate that both ad-
herence to the EMH and outbreaks of heterogeneity of the forecasts are possible outcomes. The
model presented here provides a formal representation of the view that the EMH is an important
benchmark for understanding asset prices, but it does not fully describe the underlying formation
of expectations or the resulting dynamics.
4.2 Exponential weighting
For agents using the exponential weighting function (20), we present an informal argument that a
restriction on Ut in relation to agent aggressiveness again guarantees the fraction of agents following
reectivism is increasing over time. For reectivism to increase under the dynamic (16), the
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weighted payo¤ to reectivism w (1;t) must be larger than the weighted average payo¤ wt so
wt
w (1;t)
< 1. Using exponential weighting (19), this fraction may be written
wt
w (1;t)
= x1;t 1 + x2;t 1 exp (2;t   1;t) + x3;t exp (3;t   1;t) :
To examine the dynamics around the introduction of the mystic, assume the martingale is small
and the payo¤ di¤erences in the above equation are close to zero. The following uses Taylor
approximations of the exponential functions around At 1 = 0 in the above equation with payo¤s


















and reectivisms share increases over time as with linear weighting. When the second-order
term of the Taylor approximation is included, the sign of
wt
w (1;t)
depends on the sign of 2  
U2t . Hence, if Ut is appropriately bounded then 
2   U2t is positive, but for U2t > 2, x1;t
decreases, opening the door to persistent heterogeneity in forecasting strategies. So, if the stochastic
innovations in the model are su¢ ciently large relative to agentsaggressiveness in switching to better
performing strategies, reective monotonicity does not hold and mysticism has an opportunity to
gain adherents. Again, stability and persistent heterogeneity are both possible, depending on
whether there is a su¢ cient bound on the dividends relative to the aggressiveness of the agents.
To determine the quantitative e¤ects of changes in model parameters on the likelihood for such
instability, we examine simulations of the asset pricing model.
5 Robustness
The results in the previous sections show the potential for either agreement on the fundamental
forecast within the population or persistent heterogeneity in forecasting strategies. This section
describes simulation results that quantitatively characterize the conditions that might lead to het-
erogeneous expectations by considering how the following for mysticism might increase from the
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initial minimal following17 nt 1  0. We then discuss the interpretation of the model, using it to
describe bubbles and other features of nancial market data.
5.1 Simulations
The simulation results conrm the intuition from the formal discussion. For su¢ ciently bounded
dividends and shocks to the martingale and sluggish switching between forecasting strategies, mys-
ticism cannot attract a following. With mysticism playing little or no role in the dynamics, the
reective and fundamental forecasts coincide, and the model reduces to the homogeneous environ-
ment corresponding to the EMF. However, for su¢ ciently large shocks, mysticism can attract a
signicant following, and the extraneous martingale can have an impact on the asset price, as seen
in equation (9) for nt > 0. In such a situation, the asset price still satises a weak version of the
e¢ cient markets hypothesis in that prices and returns are not forecastable, but the strong version
is not satised since information besides expected future dividends impacts the asset price.
The magnitude of the stochastic elements of the model is crucial. For mysticism to succeed,
the term based on the innovations Ut, see eq. (11), must be large relative to the curvature of w(),
which we interpret as aggressiveness of the agents. Furthermore, the term At, which is based on
the martingale, must be in a range where the covariance term UtAt 1 in the mystic payo¤ (14)
outweighs the impact of the third term with A2t 1, as indicated in the proof of Proposition 3.
Some normalization is necessary, and we set the standard deviation of the uctuation in fun-
damentals, yt   E(yt j
t 1) in (11), to  = 1. We set the discount factor to  = 0:99. The
other two parameters are either C or 2 and the standard deviation  of the martingale innovation
t = mt  mt 1. The innovation in fundamentals and the innovation in the martingale are both
taken to be normally distributed, which means that the conditions in Proposition 3 and equation
(22) for stability may be violated for some t. Whether this is quantitatively important is a key
question to be examined through simulations.
The initial population share for fundamentalism is set to the minimum x2;0 = 0:05, but mysti-
cism starts at x3;0 = 0:0001, which is 500 times smaller. At the start then, n0 = 0:002 and agents
17Binmore, Gale, and Samuelson (1995) introduce drift, which is a similar approach that examines the e¤ects of
introducing a small fraction using a strategy.
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are very nearly following the fundamentalist forecast. Therefore, if mysticism cannot attract a
much greater following, then the martingale term has little impact and the asset price is governed
by the EMH.
The unconstrained dynamic given by the weighted replicator (16) must be augmented to account
for behavior at or near the boundaries of the simplex. Assumption 1 ensures that the fraction of
followers of fundamentalism cannot fall below the minimum 2. Similarly, if x3;t falls below 0:0001
in a given period, we reset the fraction of agents following mysticism to that starting value. When
the fractions given by the unconstrained dynamics break these bounds, we set those fractions to their
minima and allocate the other fractions so that x1;t+x2;t+x3;t = 1 and the unconstrained fractions
are in proportion to their weighted payo¤s. For example, to make Assumption 1 operational, if
equation (16) sets x2;t+1 < 2, then we let x2;t+1 = 2 and use equation (16) with only the other two
forecasting strategies to determine the division of the remaining fraction18 of agents 1 2. Lastly,
when the fraction of mystics is reset to its minimum x3;t+1 = 0:0001, the martingale is restarted at
zero mt+1 = 0.
We dene robustness in terms of the probability that mysticism attains a specic percentage
following. The simulations start at x3;0 = 0:0001. We calculate the probability that x3;t  0:20
at any time within the rst 100 periods. If we frequently observe x3;t  0:20 within the rst 100
periods, we conclude that, for the given parameter values, the tendency to converge to a single
forecast is not robust to one agent in 10,000 experimenting with mysticism.
<Figures 1 and 2 here>
Figures 1 and 2 show sample simulations with  = 1:0 for exponential weighting with a low
level of aggressiveness, 2 = 1 in Figure 1, and a high level, 2 = 1=4 in Figure 2. Along with the
fractions of followers for the three strategies, the gures show the resulting asset price deviations
from its steady state. Following Branch and Evans (2010), we assume that dividends are iid,
ut~N (1:0; 1:0), which implies that the asset price under the EMH is a constant so any variation in
the asset price must be the result of heterogeneity in the forecasting strategies. Parke and Waters
(2007) show simulations of a related model with persistence in the dividend process. Persistence
18A similar rule is used if x1;t becomes negative for the unconstrained dynamic, though the details do not a¤ect
our analysis of the robustness to the introduction of mysticism.
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of the dividends a¤ects the asset price but the robustness analysis presented here depends only on
the magnitude of the innovations.
The simulation for a low level of aggressiveness in switching between strategies in Figure 1 shows
minimal variation in the asset price and mysticism never exceeds the threshold 0.2. In contrast, the
simulation in Figure 2 has multiple signicant outbreaks where mysticism is the dominant strategy
and the asset price shows deviations from its steady state value.
Table 2 (the truncation weighting function) and Table 3 (the exponential weighting function)
report results for these probabilities and show rather forcefully that mysticism will be an important
factor if agents are su¢ ciently aggressive and the martingale innovations are su¢ ciently large.
While convergence in Table 2 to a single expectation is common for C = 16 and likely for C = 8,
the probability of episodes of mysticism approaches one for smaller values of C. In Table 3, if
the convexity parameter 2 is 1=4 or smaller and the martingale innovation standard deviation 
is at least 1=8, then the probability of signicant episodes of mysticism ranges from over one-half
to 1:000. Together, Tables 2 and 3 tell a consistent story. If agents are aggressive, which we
can identify as 2  1=4 or C  4, then the outcome is not well characterized as convergence to
homogeneous expectations. The probability of repeated episodes of mysticism approaches 1.000
for some parameter combinations.
<Tables 2 and 3 here>
For martingale innovations with standard deviation above  = 2, however, the frequency of
mystic success declines. For large levels of At 1, the reective payo¤ (12) is superior, since the
large martingale terms involving A2t 1 in the payo¤s to fundamentalism (13) and mysticism (14)
overwhelm the covariance terms involving UtAt 1. This intuition is also the reason that only a
restriction on Ut, and not At 1 or the payo¤s, is necessary for stability in Proposition 3.
Tables 4-7 give a snapshot of the behavior of the model after 100 periods. Tables 4 and 6 show
the mean fraction of mystic followers x3;100 for the linear and exponential weighting cases, while
Tables 5 and 7 show the standard deviations of those values over 10,000 trials for the two cases. In
cases where mysticism could not gain followers, the mean values are at or close the starting value of
0.0001 with minimal variation. However, when mysticism has a chance, the means are well above
the minimum and show great variation in the possible outcomes, implying that it is not hard to
nd instances where mysticism is the dominant strategy.
24
<Table 4-7 here>
As noted in the introduction, the timing of the general dynamic (16) is di¤erent than some
standard developments of the replicator. For example, Samuelson (1998, p. 64) discusses a
dynamic of the form




where wt = x1;tw (1;t) + x2;tw (2;t) +   + xn;tw (n;t), whereas the dynamic (16) lags the right
hand side population shares xi;t 1, a natural step given that the time t payo¤s i;t depend on time
t 1 strategy choices represented by nt 1 in the payo¤s to fundamentalism (13) and mysticism (14).
Simulations of the model using the more standard dynamic19 (23) give almost identical outcomes
to those presented here, so the results are not dependent on the choice of timing.
5.2 Interpretation
The model with outbreaks of mysticism represents an appealing model of a bubble. Although
mysticism can gain a following for certain parameter values, it cannot last indenitely. If mysticism
is at its maximum, the presence of the minimum fraction following fundamentalism ensures that
the mystic and reective forecasts are not identical. Although the mystic forecast can outperform
the reective forecast for given periods, the expected payo¤ of the reective forecast is superior to
the expected payo¤ to mysticism so agents eventually abandon mysticism. Hence, bubbles arise
and collapse endogenously, as shown in Figure 2, in contrast to the models on rational bubbles20.
Furthermore, the reective forecast is an apt description of bubble psychology. Agents adopt a
forecast based on information they believe to be extraneous because other agents are using that
information.
In practice there could be many mystic forecasts making persistent heterogeneity more likely.
There is an abundance of variables, exchange rates and commodity prices being two of many
examples, that might be considered for use in forecasting asset prices. Hence, for a given asset, it
19Note that this dynamic could be simplied so that only xi;t+1 appears on the left hand side.
20See, for example Evans (1991). See Parke and Waters (2007) for further discussion and simulation examples.
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is quite possible that an extraneous variable exists that has the characteristics necessary to serve
the role of the martingale in the present model. We focus on a single martingale alternative to
clarify the conditions necessary for mysticism to arise. Furthermore, when one mystic forecast does
gain a following, agents will tend to coordinate on that strategy. Note that when mysticism gains
a large following, i.e. nt is close to one, the mystic payo¤ (14) is close to the reective payo¤ since
the impact of the martingale (third) term in (14) is minimized. While an extension of the model
to include more forecasts might be desirable to calibrate to nancial market data, the intuition of
the present model should hold, since agents will tend to coordinate on a successful mystic.
It might be argued that the existence of a minimum fraction of fundamentalists is unlikely given
that mysticism can have signicant periods of success. However, if all agents adopt the mystic
forecast the model collapses to a never-ending rational bubble, which is economically implausible.
As we note following Assumption 1, this minimum fraction of fundamentalists exists as long as some
agents believe standard asset pricing textbooks. The small fraction of unyielding fundamentalists
is all that is necessary to ensure that the asset price remains connected to the dividends in the long
run.
The conclusion that extraneous information embodied in the mystic forecast can a¤ect asset
prices depending on magnitude of the shocks and the aggressiveness of the agents has both theoret-
ical and quantitative support. Hence, asset price bubbles arising from the presence of mysticism
are a denite possibility, but so are stretches of time where the EMH is satised. The shocks
to the fundamentals are closely related to the uncertainty about future dividends, suggesting that
bubbles are more likely to arise for the stocks of rms in new industries or for recently developed
asset classes, where judgements about future prots and performance are di¢ cult.
Parke and Waters (2007) show that, when conditions are favorable for repeated episodes of
mysticism, the observed excess returns will exhibit volatility clustering. Standard tests for autore-
gressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) reject the null of homoskedasticity. The widespread
nding of ARCH e¤ects in empirical work could thus be taken as supporting the notion that ag-
gressive agents are precluding convergence to a single expectation.
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6 Summary and Conclusions
Our evolutionary game theory approach demonstrates that agreement on a unique rational expec-
tation and the persistent presence of heterogeneous forecasts based on extraneous information are
both distinct possibilities. The primary determining factor is the aggressiveness of the agents in
switching forecasts relative to the magnitude of the stochastic elements. Convexity in the weighting
function of the payo¤s in the evolutionary game theory dynamic is directly related to the switching
speed. Sluggish adjustment and small shocks correspond to stability of the point where mysticism
is eliminated and agents coordinate on a forecast corresponding to the e¢ cient markets hypothesis.
Higher aggressiveness gives rise to the possibility that mysticism could play a signicant role in
asset price dynamics, potentially leading to persistent deviations from the fundamental forecast.
These results have a direct bearing on the merits of assuming that all agents agree on a single
forecast. The theoretical results imply that such an assumption may be a reasonable abstraction
for agents not overly aggressive in pursuing the best forecast, but also imply that an environment
populated by aggressive agents may be fertile ground for emergence of heterogeneous expectations.
The simulation results conrm that, for our asset pricing example, su¢ cient agent aggressiveness
can lead to persistent heterogeneous expectations.
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Appendix
To prove Proposition 3, we rst examine the one case where, given the restriction in the propo-
sition, reectivism could lose followers, but mysticism is eliminated. This situation arises for a
small n when the covariance term UA is negative and fundamentalism gains followers. The details
of the proof are rather involved but the intuition is the following. If n is small, for fundamentalism
to be the best, the term A2 must be so large that the weighted payo¤ to mysticism must be zero
in two successive periods, ensuring that mystic followers are eliminated from the population.
Lemma 6 If w(2;t) > 0 and w(3;t) = 0, then either x1;t+1 > x1;t or x3;t+1 = 0.
Proof. Examining the dynamic (16) for mysticism, if w(3;t) = 0 and x3;t 1  x3;t then
x3;t+1 = 0 follows directly. We must show that if x1;t+1 > x1;t is not true, then it must be the
case that x3;t 1  x3;t, which implies that mysticism is eliminated in period t + 1. This case is
somewhat di¤erent than the case where the weighted payo¤ on fundamentalism is zero, since we
do not assume a minimum bound on mysticism.
If x1;t+1  x1;t and w(3;t) = 0, then fundamentalism must gain adherents so w(2;t) > 0: The
condition w(1;t)  wt becomes (1  x1;t 1)w(1;t)  x2;t 1w(2;t), which is equivalent to





Since w(2;t) > 0, it must be the case that UtAt 1 < 0. From the condition in the proposition
C   U2t > (1  ')C and jUtj <
p




implies that jAt 1j  A0. Note that as '! 0, A0 !1:
To show that x3;t 1  x3;t, we must demonstrate that w(3;t 1) = 0; which is equivalent to
C   U2t 1 < (1  nt 2)
 
 2Ut 1At 2 + (1  nt 2)A2t 2

: (25)
If this inequality is true for Ut 1At 2 > 0, it is true for Ut 1At 2 < 0 as well. Since C   U2t > C,
jUtj <
p
'C and 1   nt 2 > 2, there exists an A00 such that jAt 2j > A00 guarantees the above
inequality, and A00 is decreasing in '. Here, for the inequality to hold the A2 term must be
su¢ ciently large, in contrast to the inequality (24), where jUAj must be su¢ ciently large.
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However, a lower bound on At 1 implies a lower bound on At 2. By denition (see the
discussion after equation (12)), the term At 1 =  t 1mt 1 =  1At 2+ t 1t 1; recalling that
t is the innovation to the martingale, or At 2 = At 1  tt 1. The denition of U (11) in light
its bound jU j <
p
'C for any n 2 [0; 1] implies that
 tt 1 < p'C. Hence, if x1;t+1  x1;t and





as ' ! 0 and A00 is decreasing in ', there exists a '0 su¢ ciently small so that A0 is large enough
and A00 is small enough to ensure that At 2 > A00; so the inequality (25) is satised, w(3;t 1) = 0
and x3;t 1  x3;t, as required.
The following proof of Proposition 3 covers the other cases.
Proof. The bound on U2t guarantees that w(1;t) > 0. If w(2;t) > 0 and w(3;t) > 0, then the
inequality in Remark 1 (15) implies that w(1;t) > wt and so x1;t+1 > x1;t. The same inequality
holds if both w(2;t) = 0 and w(3;t) = 0.
Suppose then that w(2;t) = 0 and w(3;t) > 0. The case where x2;t+1 hits its minimum 2 is
treated rst as a separate case. If x2;t+1 is xed, the x1;t+1 > x1;t if and only if w(1;t) > w(3;t)
for any reasonable dynamic. This condition is equivalent to
2 (1  nt 1)UtAt 1   (1  nt)2A2t 1 < 0: (26)
Since w(2;t) = 0 in this case, it must be true that
C   U2t   2nt 1UtAt 1   n2t 1At 12 < 0;





2 > (1  ')C.
For this inequality to be true, there must be a minimum A000 > 0 such that jAt 1j > A000.
Now, we can show the inequality (26) guaranteeing w(1;t) > w(3;t) is satised in this case for
some '0 su¢ ciently small. If Ut and At 1 have di¤erent signs, (26) is satised automatically. If
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(1  nt) jAt 1j (27)
In this case, we have jAt 1j > A000 > 0. Furthermore, since x2;t+1  2; it is also the case
that (1  nt) > 2. Therefore, there exists a '00 2 (0; 1) such that for Ut2 < 'C, the inequality
(27) is satised and therefore so is x1;t+1 > x1;t
For the case where w(2;t) = 0 and w(3;t) > 0 when x2;t+1 is greater than its minimum, the
condition for x1;t+1 > x1;t is w(1;t) > nt 1w(3;t), which is weaker than the condition w(1;t) >
w(3;t) for the case when x2;t+1 = 2, so the argument above applies.
3So x1;t+1 > x1;t except in the case covered by the lemma above where x3;t+1 = 0: So for
' = min f'0; '00g Proposition 3 holds.
The proof of Corollary 5 follows. The one minor complication is that x1   ex1 is not the same
as the distance between x and ex.
Proof. Given " > 0, there exists a 0 > 0 such that x1;t   ex1 < 0 implies that x1;t 2 B(ex; "):
Similarly, given 0 > 0, there exists a  > 0 such that x1;t 2 B(ex; ) implies that x1;t   ex < 0:
Therefore, x1;t 2 B(ex; ) implies that x1;t   ex < 0 and Proposition 3 implies that x1;t+k   ex < 0
or x3;t+k = 0. Hence, xt+k 2 B(ex; ") or x3;t+k = 0:
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Table 1
Payo¤ Ordering If At 1; nt 1 > 0
Realized Ut Best Payo¤ Middle Payo¤ Worst Payo¤
Ut <  nt 1At 1=2 Fund. Re. Myst.
 nt 1At 1=2 < Ut < (1  2nt 1)At 1=2 Re. Fund. Myst.
(1  2nt 1)At 1=2 < Ut < (1  nt 1)At 1=2 Re. Myst. Fund.
(1  nt 1)At 1=2 < Ut Myst. Re. Fund.
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Truncated Squared Errors (18)
Probability x3;t  0:20 for some t  100
10,000 trials
C = 16 C = 8 C = 4 C = 2 C = 1
 = 1=16 0.001 0.065 0.357 0.642 0.776
 = 1=8 0.002 0.088 0.507 0.829 0.939
 = 1=4 0.002 0.122 0.649 0.951 0.994
 = 1=2 0.002 0.151 0.752 0.988 1.000
 = 1 0.003 0.173 0.834 0.997 1.000
 = 2 0.003 0.183 0.846 0.998 1.000
 = 4 0.003 0.172 0.774 0.979 0.997
 = 8 0.002 0.110 0.570 0.882 0.953




Probability x3;t  0:20 for some t  100
10,000 trials
2 = 1 2 = 1=2 2 = 1=4 2 = 1=8 2 = 1=16
 = 1=16 0.001 0.015 0.157 0.444 0.615
 = 1=8 0.001 0.051 0.382 0.802 0.948
 = 1=4 0.003 0.128 0.671 0.970 0.998
 = 1=2 0.006 0.235 0.848 0.996 1.000
 = 1 0.011 0.327 0.910 0.999 1.000
 = 2 0.018 0.341 0.890 0.998 1.000
 = 4 0.015 0.258 0.762 0.973 0.998
 = 8 0.010 0.153 0.530 0.861 0.953
 = 16 0.006 0.070 0.305 0.613 0.780
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Table 4
Truncated Squared Errors (18)
Mean of x3;100
10,000 trials
C = 16 C = 8 C = 4 C = 2 C = 1
 = 1=16 0.0011 0.0428 0.0863 0.0655 0.0504
 = 1=8 0.0013 0.0599 0.1118 0.1023 0.0880
 = 1=4 0.0017 0.0580 0.1361 0.1406 0.1425
 = 1=2 0.0012 0.0485 0.1259 0.1650 0.1765
 = 1 0.0013 0.0257 0.0871 0.1591 0.1936
 = 2 0.0005 0.0115 0.0528 0.1145 0.1540
 = 4 0.0002 0.0051 0.0303 0.0661 0.0913
 = 8 0.0001 0.0024 0.0154 0.0344 0.0465
 = 16 0.0001 0.0012 0.0066 0.0179 0.0253
Table 5
Truncated Squared Errors (18)
Standard Deviation of x3;100
10,000 trials
C = 16 C = 8 C = 4 C = 2 C = 1
 = 1=16 0.0296 0.1880 0.2593 0.2295 0.2032
 = 1=8 0.0326 0.2186 0.2888 0.2792 0.2614
 = 1=4 0.0371 0.2128 0.3128 0.3179 0.3195
 = 1=2 0.0295 0.1963 0.3030 0.3377 0.3464
 = 1 0.0310 0.1452 0.2590 0.3337 0.3574
 = 2 0.0194 0.0993 0.2063 0.2917 0.3275
 = 4 0.0087 0.0658 0.1581 0.2283 0.2639
 = 8 0.0000 0.0450 0.1142 0.1678 0.1948






2 = 1 2 = 1=2 2 = 1=4 2 = 1=8 2 = 1=16
 = 1=16 0.0002 0.0032 0.0218 0.0459 0.0405
 = 1=8 0.0004 0.0067 0.0464 0.0955 0.0957
 = 1=4 0.0005 0.0148 0.0819 0.1459 0.1621
 = 1=2 0.0010 0.0262 0.1124 0.1952 0.2124
 = 1 0.0011 0.0285 0.1022 0.1783 0.2058
 = 2 0.0010 0.0173 0.0613 0.1150 0.1529
 = 4 0.0005 0.0062 0.0249 0.0631 0.0883
 = 8 0.0003 0.0029 0.0116 0.0300 0.0459
 = 16 0.0003 0.0012 0.0053 0.0146 0.0246
Table 7
Exponential Weighting (19)
Standard Deviation of x3;100
10,000 trials
2 = 1 2 = 1=2 2 = 1=4 2 = 1=8 2 = 1=16
 = 1=16 0.0012 0.0307 0.1025 0.1506 0.1368
 = 1=8 0.0056 0.0524 0.1583 0.2263 0.2208
 = 1=4 0.0088 0.0864 0.2202 0.2807 0.2893
 = 1=2 0.0169 0.1249 0.2595 0.3221 0.3305
 = 1 0.0217 0.1341 0.2512 0.3160 0.3316
 = 2 0.0215 0.1065 0.2000 0.2663 0.3029
 = 4 0.0143 0.0620 0.1282 0.2064 0.2433
 = 8 0.0091 0.0442 0.0861 0.1427 0.1816
 = 16 0.0127 0.0273 0.0587 0.1001 0.1357
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